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“SLICING A SHADOW”1:
THE DEBATE OVER COMBINED REPORTING AND
ITS EFFECT ON WISCONSIN’S BUSINESS CLIMATE
I.

INTRODUCTION

A recent dispute2 between the Wisconsin Department of Revenue and
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. over whether Wal-Mart‘s business structure is in fact a
tax avoidance strategy brought a familiar debate to the surface yet again:
should Wisconsin adopt combined reporting?3 The case for combined
reporting seems simple: corporations doing business in Wisconsin would be
forced to pay their fair share of taxes to Wisconsin. However, as the Supreme
Court has noted, ―[a]llocating income among various taxing jurisdictions
bears some resemblance . . . to slicing a shadow.‖4
In 2007, the State of Wisconsin began to take notice of the way Wal-Mart
structures itself within Wisconsin borders. 5 Although Wisconsin‘s largest
private employer6 paid $36.8 million in state and local taxes in Wisconsin in
2008,7 the State believes it should be paying more. 8 However, Wal-Mart is
not the only corporation arguably paying less than its fair share of state taxes.
Through a combination of tax avoidance strategies, deductions, and
incentives, companies doing business in Wisconsin are avoiding the
responsibility of helping support valuable state and local public services,
leaving the burden with individuals. In 2005, close to 50,000 corporations
filed returns in Wisconsin, and two-thirds of those returns ―showed a bottom1. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 192 (1983).
2. See, e.g., Steven Walters & Avrum D. Lank, Wal-Mart Owes Back Taxes, State Says: Paying
Rent to Itself Cuts Millions off Retailer’s Tax Bill, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 26, 2007, at A1.
3. Under a combined reporting regime, taxes are computed by treating all members of a unitary
business as one, i.e., the corporate structure is ignored. See infra Part II.A.
4. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 192.
5. See Walters & Lank, supra note 2. An article that appeared on the front page of the Wall
Street Journal in February of 2007 discussing North Carolina‘s fight to close the same loophole that
Wal-Mart is utilizing in Wisconsin possibly motivated the Department of Revenue‘s action. Jesse
Drucker, Friendly Landlord: Wal-Mart Cuts Taxes By Paying Rent To Itself—Other Retailers, Banks
Use Loophole in Rules to Lower States’ Levies, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2007, at A1.
6. Walters & Lank, supra note 2. Wal-Mart currently employs 30,097 Wisconsin residents in
58 Supercenters, 25 discount stores, 12 Sam‘s Clubs, and 3 distribution centers. Wal-Mart State-byState Information, http://walmartstores.com/FactsNews/StateByState/State.aspx?id=48 (last visited
May 28, 2009).
7. Wal-Mart State-by-State Information, supra note 6.
8. See Walters & Lank, supra note 2. The Department of Revenue sought $17.7 million in
back taxes, interest, and penalties for tax years 1998, 1999, and 2000. Id.
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line tax of zero dollars.‖9 As the Institute for Wisconsin‘s Future puts it, ―[i]t
makes no sense . . . to have a tax system in which individual companies are
able to choose as a matter of internal strategy whether or not to pay taxes.‖ 10
As with most things in life, adopting combined reporting as a solution to
tax avoidance is not as simple as it seems. There are various considerations
that any state proposing a change to its tax structure must keep in mind. The
focus of this Comment is the current state of the business climate in
Wisconsin and how much impact the business climate rankings should have
on discussing a change to the state tax structure given the faults of the
structure currently in place. Part II.A will discuss the meaning of combined
reporting. Part II.B will analyze the Department of Revenue‘s case against
Wal-Mart as well as other similar tax avoidance strategies that have been
utilized in Wisconsin. Part II.C will focus on the current state of Wisconsin‘s
business climate, the various rankings, and what effect the rankings should
have on the decision to locate a business within Wisconsin‘s borders.
Part III of this Comment will analyze Wisconsin‘s three available options
for combating the most common tax avoidance strategies: attacking each tax
avoidance scheme individually, passing legislation targeted at specific tax
avoidance schemes, and adopting combined reporting. Finally, Part IV will
conclude that Wisconsin should seriously consider adopting combined
reporting, as it is the most effective method for combating the various tax
avoidance strategies, and it will help, not hurt, the business climate in the long
run.
II. A PRIMER ON COMBINED REPORTING AND TAX AVOIDANCE STRATEGIES
IN WISCONSIN
A. What is Combined Reporting?
The three approaches currently used by states in determining corporate
taxable income are separate accounting, formulary apportionment, and
combined reporting. 11 Separate accounting treats each corporate entity as a
separate taxable entity, regardless of the interconnectedness of its dealings
with a parent or subsidiary.12 It is ―based on the premise that it is both

9. INST. FOR WIS.‘S
AVOIDANCE 1 (2007).

FUTURE, WISCONSIN‘S REVENUE GAP: AN ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE TAX

10. Id. at 12.
11. Richard D. Pomp, State Tax Reform: Proposals for Wisconsin, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 45, 49
(2004).
12. Id. at 53; see also Richard D. Pomp, The Future of the State Corporate Income Tax:
Reflections (and Confessions) of a Tax Lawyer, in THE FUTURE OF STATE TAXATION 49, 60 (David
Brunori ed., 1998) (defining separate entity states as ―[s]tates that calculate the taxable income and
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possible and practical to isolate the taxable income of portions of the business
that a corporation carries on within a state.‖ 13 Dealings between subsidiaries
of the same parent company are treated as transactions between unrelated
parties. If Company A, a subsidiary of Parent Company, manufactures Good
X and delivers it to Company B, another subsidiary of Parent Company, a
hypothetical arm‘s length sales price, or transfer price, will need to be
determined for tax purposes.14
Separate accounting is not practical. As the above transfer pricing
illustration shows, determining a corporation‘s sales proceeds based on
hypothetical prices or, as is common, by determining the price at which
manufacturers sell comparable goods to independent distributors can be
administratively difficult.15 Furthermore, the number may not reflect the
actual proceeds or profitability of the corporation, especially when that figure
depends on activities that are integrated with subsidiaries of the same parent. 16
The value of being part of a large synergistic operation cannot be fully
conveyed through transfer prices.17
Formulary apportionment and combined reporting were developed in
response to the inherent problems with separate accounting. 18 The current
system in place in Wisconsin is formulary apportionment, which works as
follows: each company uses a formula to determine the percentage that should
be apportioned to the company‘s in-state activities or ―presence.‖ 19 First, the
company uses Wisconsin law to compute its worldwide taxable income,
which is the company‘s pre-apportionment tax base.20 Next, the company
determines its apportionment percentage—an equation based on the
company‘s sales, payroll, and property located in Wisconsin compared with

apportionment percentage of the parent and ignore the taxable income and factors of the subsidiary,
with which they have no connection or nexus‖).
13. Pomp, supra note 11, at 49.
14. Id. at 50.
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 50–51.
18. Id. at 49.
19. Id. at 51–52. Wisconsin‘s system of apportionment was upheld by the United States
Supreme Court in Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 229–30 (1980).
Against Exxon Corporation‘s argument that it did not have a sufficient nexus with Wisconsin to
permit Wisconsin to include all of Exxon‘s net income in the apportionment formula, the Court
reiterated its long-held belief that ―‗the entire net income of a corporation, generated by interstate as
well as intrastate activities, may be fairly apportioned among the States for tax purposes by formulas
utilizing in-state aspects of interstate affairs.‘‖ Id. at 219 (quoting Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v.
Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 460 (1959)).
20. WIS. STAT. § 71.25(5)(a) (2007–2008); Pomp, supra note 11, at 52.
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the same factors on a worldwide basis. 21 Finally, the taxable income of the
corporation apportioned to Wisconsin is determined by multiplying its
worldwide taxable income by the apportionment percentage. 22
Implicit in the adoption of formulary apportionment is the belief that
determining a corporation‘s taxable income based on sales, payroll, and
property is the superior method.23 Combined reporting is merely an extension
of that belief.24 ―The central element of [the case for combined reporting] is
that the substance of the business activities in the state should control, not the
organizational structure of the business entity or entities conducting those
activities.‖25
Combined reporting is a tax regime used in almost half of the states and is
being considered in several others. 26 Under a combined reporting taxation
system, taxes are determined on the parent company level; in other words,
corporate structure is ignored. The parent company and its subsidiaries are all
treated as if they are part of the same unitary business.27
For accounting purposes, a combined report is a ―document prepared on
behalf of a group of corporations engaged in a unitary business.‖28 The first
step in compiling a combined report is to determine the scope of the unitary
business (i.e., the parent company and its subsidiaries) to determine the
group‘s aggregate taxable income. 29 Once the aggregate taxable income is
21. Wisconsin Department of Revenue Form 4B: Wisconsin Apportionment Data lays out the
apportionment formula, which includes a double-weighted sales factor. Form 4B can be accessed on
the Department of Revenue‘s website at http://www.dor.state.wi.us/forms/2008/08ic-043.pdf.
22. Id.; see also Pomp, supra note 11, at 52.
23. Pomp, supra note 11, at 52.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 53.
26. Avrum D. Lank, Lawmakers Weigh Change in Business Taxes; Combined Reporting Could
Bring in Millions, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept., 22, 2007, at D1. The states that have adopted
combined reporting so far are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas,
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oregon, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia. See MICHAEL MAZEROV, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POLICY PRIORITIES, STATE CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS AND THE NEED FOR ―COMBINED
REPORTING‖ 5 n.1 (2007), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/10-26-07sfp.pdf; ROBERT M.
NACKER, WIS. ECON. DEV. INST., WHITHER COMBINED REPORTING—AN ECONOMIC VIEWPOINT 5
tbl.1 (2008), available at http://www.weda.org/about/legislative/pdf/WEDA_Combined_Reporting_
02_20_08_Final.pdf. Additionally, adopting combined reporting has been considered by Iowa,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. Id.; Giles Sutton &
Nicholas E. Ford, The Impact of Legal Entities on the Mechanics of Unitary Reporting, in TAX
STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES,
FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 2007, at 118, 125 n.11 (PLI Tax Law &
Estate Planning, Course Handbook Series No. J-770, 2007).
27. Pomp, supra note 11, at 53–54.
28. Id. at 54.
29. Id. Transactions between members of the group are usually eliminated from the
computation of aggregate taxable income. Id.
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determined, the next step is to determine how much of the income the
company should apportion to the state. This amount is determined by
multiplying the aggregate taxable income of the group by each member of the
group‘s apportionment percentage. 30 Each member of the unitary group that
has a nexus within the state is taxed on its share of the unitary income
apportioned to the state.31
In contrast, states that do not use combined reporting, known as
―[s]eparate entity states[,] treat related corporations as if they were unrelated
strangers.‖32 This is true even with subsidiaries and their parent companies.
The income and factors of the parent and the subsidiary have absolutely no
effect on the tax calculations of the other. 33 Therefore, when a corporation
has a subsidiary located outside of the state that does not directly conduct
business within the state, the state will not be able to collect taxes from the
subsidiary even if the parent handles all the assets of the subsidiary.
Doubts about combined reporting‘s constitutionality were eliminated by
the United States Supreme Court when it upheld the use of combined
reporting twice in the last twenty-five years, first in 198334 and again in
1994.35 In the first case, Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board,
the Court held that California‘s method of combined reporting did not violate
the United States Constitution. 36 Container Corp., a Delaware corporation
headquartered in Illinois, claimed California‘s use of the unitary
business/formula apportionment method—another way of saying combined
reporting37—in the taxing scheme violated the Due Process and Commerce
Clauses of the Constitution.38 The Court disagreed, stating that while ―a State
may not, when imposing an income-based tax, ‗tax value earned outside its
borders,‘‖ figuring out the exact ―territorial allocation[]‖ of that value is
difficult.39 Therefore, the Court concluded that each state may enforce its

30. Id. Apportionment percentage is determined by performing the apportionment formula for
each corporation in the group. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 53.
33. Id.
34. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
35. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
36. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 184.
37. Combined reporting is a simpler way of describing the unitary business and formula
apportionment methods described in Container Corp. Id. at 165. The unitary business half of the
equation describes the process of defining the scope of the unitary business, and the formula
apportionment half describes the process of apportioning the income of the unitary business to the
taxing state. Id.
38. Id. at 162.
39. Id. at 164.
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own tax scheme, and the taxpayer must prove that the tax scheme results in
―‗extraterritorial values being taxed.‘‖40
In addition, the Court laid out the requirements for a constitutionally valid
state taxing scheme that attempts to tax interstate businesses. First, there must
be a nexus between the taxing state and the interstate activities that gives rise
to the tax at issue.41 Additionally, there must be ―‗a rational relationship
between the income attributed to the State and the intrastate values of the
enterprise.‘‖42 On the formula apportionment side, the first requirement is
that the apportionment formula be fair under the Due Process and Commerce
Clauses of the United States Constitution. 43 Fairness has two components:
internal consistency and external consistency. 44 Internal consistency requires
that, if the formula were applied in every jurisdiction, the unitary business
would be taxed on all of its income but no more. 45 External consistency
requires that the ―factor or factors used in the apportionment formula must
actually reflect a reasonable sense of how income is generated.‖ 46 The final
requirement is that, in addition to being fair, the apportionment formula must
not violate the Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate or
foreign commerce. 47 If a state taxing scheme does not violate any of these
requirements, it should be immune to constitutional challenge.
However, the Court‘s decision in Container Corp. did not end the
constitutional challenges to combined reporting. California‘s system was
challenged yet again in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of
California,48 but this time it was the application of the system to foreign-based
companies that brought scrutiny under the Commerce Clause. Barclays Bank,
a United Kingdom corporation, challenged California‘s use of combined
reporting to tax income attributed to Barclays within the state, arguing that the
system ―burdens foreign-based multinationals and results in double
international taxation.‖49 Once more the Court rejected the constitutional
challenge, holding that ―the Constitution does not impede application of
California‘s corporate franchise tax to Barclays.‖50 Again, the Court stated

40. Id. (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Wis. Dep‘t of Rev., 447 U.S. 207, 221 (1980)).
41. Id. at 165–66. In short, nexus requires that there is a ―‗minimal connection . . . between the
interstate activities and the taxing State.‘‖ Id. (quoting Exxon Corp., 447 U.S. at 219–20).
42. Id. at 166 (quoting Exxon Corp., 447 U.S. at 219–20).
43. Id. at 169.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 170.
48. 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
49. Id. at 302.
50. Id. at 303.
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that to be deemed violative of the Commerce Clause the taxpayer must show
that the tax applies to activity lacking a substantial nexus to the taxing state, is
not fairly apportioned, discriminates against interstate commerce, or is not
fairly related to services provided by the state. 51
Twenty-two states currently have combined reporting systems in place,
six of which have been enacted within the past five years.52 As a recent report
by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities states, ―[a] major reason for
states‘ growing interest [in combined reporting] is their recognition of how
badly corporate tax shelters that exploit the lack of combined reporting are
eroding state corporate tax payments.‖53 The report extols the virtues of using
combined reporting to eliminate certain state corporate tax shelters, like the
real estate investment trust (REIT) strategy used by Wal-Mart and the passive
investment company (PIC) loophole used by Wisconsin banks. 54
B. Tax Avoidance Strategies in Wisconsin
Among the many tax shelters used by corporations today, three of the
most common involve the creation of subsidiaries that are exempt from
corporate income tax in the state of formation. 55 These three types are PICs,
REITs, and captive insurance companies. 56 Corporations use these shelters
either to shift taxable profits to the subsidiary or to stash income-earning
assets.57 Combined reporting could nullify all three tax shelters, as well as
others.58 However, while combined reporting would effectively eliminate
many tax shelters at use today, it would not stop the lawyers and accountants
working with these corporations from coming up with new inventive ways to
avoid taxes. Fortunately, combined reporting would make it more difficult to
develop tax avoidance schemes and would leave fewer loopholes to be
exploited.
In the past decade, Wisconsin has attempted to put an end to two tax
shelters—REITs and PICs. The most recent of the two attacks—Wal-Mart‘s

51. Id. at 310–11. These four criteria of state tax Commerce Clause scrutiny were first
developed in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977), and together they are
known as the Complete Auto four-prong test. See Christopher R. Grissom et al., Challenges to
Addback Statutes: Will the Statutes Survive?, 46 ST. TAX NOTES 757, 775 (2007).
52. See MAZEROV, supra note 26, at 1; NACKER, supra note 26, at 5 tbl.1.
53. MAZEROV, supra note 26, at 1.
54. Id. at 2; see discussion infra Part II.B.
55. MAZEROV, supra note 26, at 2.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2–3.
58. Id. at 3–5. Combined reporting would also nullify the transfer pricing and nexus is olation
loopholes. See infra notes 169–70 and accompanying text.
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use of the REIT—will be discussed first, followed by the PIC strategy used by
Wisconsin banks.
1. Wal-Mart and the REIT
Wal-Mart uses REITs59 as a way to avoid paying the full amount of
corporate income taxes it would otherwise be required to pay. Since 1996,
Wal-Mart has structured its operations in twenty-seven states as follows: one
subsidiary, Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust, a REIT, is set up to manage
the land that the stores sit on, and one subsidiary, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., is set
up to manage the stores themselves. 60 The store management subsidiary pays
rent to the REIT subsidiary for the land the stores sit on and deducts the
amount of the rent from its taxable income as a business expense. 61 Setting
high rent payments leaves Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. with ―little to no profit on
which state taxes ha[ve] to be paid.‖ 62 This technique works because
Wisconsin‘s tax laws call for separate reporting—all companies file separate
returns, even if a single parent owns multiple subsidiaries. Under combined
reporting, both subsidiaries would be included on the return filed by their
parent company; shifting money among subsidiaries would no longer be an
option.
In response, two separate parts of Wisconsin‘s government took action. 63
First, the state legislature got involved. Effective for tax years beginning
January 1, 2008, Wisconsin now requires that certain amounts deducted or
excluded from gross income for federal tax purposes—specifically, interest
and rent expenses that are paid, accrued, or incurred to one or more related
entities—must be ―added back‖ before determining net income for Wisconsin
tax purposes.64

59. Real estate investment trusts will be discussed in more detail infra.
60. INST. FOR WIS.‘S FUTURE, supra note 9, at 13–14.
61. Walters & Lank, supra note 2.
62. INST. FOR WIS.‘S FUTURE, supra note 9, at 14.
63. See Walters & Lank, supra note 2. While the Department of Revenue‘s case against WalMart has brought these issues to the surface yet again, Wal-Mart is not the only company the state is
concerned about. ―[T]hree of the largest corporations in the U.S.—Microsoft, Merck & Co. and
Sears Holdings, owner of Kmart and Lands‘ End—paid no corporate income taxes in Wisconsin in
2005.‖ Mike Ivey, Pols Go After Tax Dodgers; Bill Aims to Plug Corporate Loopholes, CAPITAL
TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Dec. 19, 2007, at A1.
64. WIS. STAT. § 71.26(2) (2007–2008); Edward Sakurai, Continued Trend Toward State
Related-Party Expense Addback, 39 TAX ADVISER 807, 807 (2008). The ―addback statute,‖ as it is
commonly referred to, will be discussed in more detail infra Part III.B. Additionally, Senator Dave
Hansen (D-Green Bay) introduced the Corporate Tax Accountability Act to the Wisconsin
Legislature in December 2007. S.B. 367, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2007); see also discussion infra
Part III.B.
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Second, the Department of Revenue brought a case against Wal-Mart, Inc.
before the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission to recover $17.7 million in
back corporate taxes, interest, and penalties from 1998 to 2000. 65 Department
lawyer Mark Zimmer believes that Wal-Mart is not paying its fair share for
the Wisconsin resources it utilizes in operating its stores.66 Instead, Wal-Mart
shifts the burden ―to individuals and small businesses who are unable to set up
such elaborate mechanisms.‖67
Since REITs are complicated structures, some explanation of their
formation and tax attributes may be helpful. A REIT is a pass-through entity
used for holding real estate.68 Created by Section 856 of Title 26 of the
United States Code, a REIT may qualify for special tax treatment under the
Internal Revenue Code as a common law business trust, a corporation, or any
other association that is taxable as a corporation. 69 Regardless of the chosen
business entity, REITs are taxed as domestic corporations under Subchapter C
of the Internal Revenue Code. 70
There are four major types of REITs being used in America today: equity
trusts, mortgage trusts, hybrid trusts, and finite life trusts.71 Equity trusts are
typically organized as ―blind pools‖ for investing in several unidentified rental
properties held for an indefinite period of time for the purpose of producing
income from rents that are then distributable to shareholders as dividends. 72
The Wal-Mart version of the REIT is slightly different. Instead of investing
65. See Walters & Lank, supra note 2.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See WILLIAM A. KELLEY, JR., REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS HANDBOOK 22 (2d ed.
1998). A pass-through entity is a non-taxable entity, such as a partnership, limited liability company,
or Subchapter-S Corporation, where the entity computes its taxable income and then passes that
income on to its owners as distributive shares. See HOWARD E. ABRAMS, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND OTHER P ASS-THRU ENTITIES 9 (1993). The owners of the entity
are responsible for the taxes due on the entity‘s earnings, i.e., the tax burden is ―passed-through‖ to
the owners. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 701 (2006) (―A partnership as such shall not be subject to the
income tax imposed by this chapter. Persons carrying on business as partners shall be liable for
income tax only in their separate or individual capacities.‖).
69. 26 U.S.C. § 856 (2006); see KELLEY, supra note 68, at 22.
70. 26 U.S.C. §§ 301–385 (2006).
71. KELLEY, supra note 68, at 8–11.
72. Id. For comparison purposes, the mortgage trust is similar to the equity trust but, instead of
holding real estate, the trust is organized for ―investing the proceeds from the sale of their shares in
mortgages secured by real property, or mortgage-backed pass-through certificates.‖ Id. at 9. Hybrid
trusts are organized for investing in a combination of equity properties and mortgages. Id. at 10.
Finite life trusts became popular in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a response to a weak market for
REIT shares. Id. at 11. Investors were interested in seeing a return on their investment during their
lifetime. The difference between an equity trust and a finite life trust is the duration of the
investment. Finite life trusts are organized to acquire property for a pre-determined amount of
time—typically four to fifteen years—after which the properties are liquidated and the proceeds
distributed to the shareholders. Id.
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in unidentified rental properties, Wal-Mart‘s REITs are organized for the
acquisition of specific properties—the property on which the Wal-Mart store
sits.73
To qualify as a REIT, and therefore qualify for a tax deduction for
dividends paid to shareholders,74 an organization must meet Internal Revenue
Code qualifications relating to status, income, and investment.75 Among the
many requirements for forming and operating a REIT, two elements of
specific relevance are the requirements that the REIT must have at least 100
investors and that it must pay out at least ninety percent of its annual earnings
to investors as dividends.76 In the federal tax system, those dividends are
taxable due to an act of Congress that ―made dividend payments from REITs
to other corporations ineligible for the ‗dividends-received deduction,‘ which
effectively exempts most dividends paid from one corporation to another from
the federal corporate income tax.‖77 The REIT loophole utilized by Wal-Mart
in Wisconsin and elsewhere was created when states failed to follow in
Congress‘s footsteps. 78 The result: income earned by REITs is completely
untaxed in many states.79
Wisconsin is not the only state that has been affected by Wal-Mart‘s tax
avoidance strategies. According to Standard & Poor‘s Compustat, Wal-Mart
has paid, on average, only half of the statutory state tax rates during the past
decade, and the REIT strategy alone cut its state taxes by around twenty
percent over one four-year period. 80 In response, several states have tried or
are trying to put an end to the REIT loophole‘s use. 81
In a well-publicized battle between Wal-Mart and the state of North
Carolina,82 the state is attempting to put an end to Wal-Mart‘s REIT structure,
calling the strategy an attempt to ―‗distort [the company‘s] true net

73. See Drucker, supra note 5.
74. KELLEY, supra note 68, at 11.
75. 26 U.S.C. § 856(c) (2006).
76. 26 U.S.C. § 856(a); MAZEROV, supra note 26, at 11.
77. 26 U.S.C. § 243(d)(3) (2006); MAZEROV, supra note 26, at 12.
78. See MAZEROV, supra note 26, at 12. Wisconsin has effectively closed this loophole with
the addback statute that will be discussed in more detail infra Part III.B.
79. Id. at 12.
80. See Drucker, supra note 5 (alteration in original).
81. Jack Wood, Wal-Mart’s Tax Shelter Room, NEWSTEX WEB BLOGS, Oct. 23, 2007. Since
the Drucker article appeared in the Wall Street Journal in February, six states—including Illinois,
Maryland, New York, and Rhode Island—―have passed laws attempting to prohibit the maneuver.‖
Id.
82. David Ranii, Wal-Mart Suit Plows Ahead, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 1,
2007, at D3. The case was thrust into the national spotlight in February 2007 by Drucker‘s Wall
Street Journal article, supra note 5.
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income.‘‖83 In 2005, North Carolina ordered Wal-Mart to pay $33 million in
back taxes.84 The company paid the bill but turned around and sued the state
for a $30.2 million tax refund, accusing the state of ―improperly assessing its
corporate income tax bill.‖85 Following an audit, the North Carolina
Department of Revenue determined that the company‘s tax return did not
―disclose [its] true earnings‖ and forced it to file a single consolidated
return.86 The state then calculated an overall tax bill based on all of WalMart‘s North Carolina stores, including its Sam‘s Club locations as well as its
REITs.87 Wal-Mart claims that this method of tax calculation violates the Due
Process and Commerce Clauses of the U.S. Constitution by determining
taxable income ―in an arbitrary manner, without the guidance of any
constitutionally acceptable standard.‖88 Consistent with prior Supreme Court
holdings, the Wake County judge did not agree and rejected Wal-Mart‘s
claim. 89 Wal-Mart has appealed the ruling.90
Unfortunately, Wal-Mart is not the only company using the REIT
loophole to its advantage. According to the Wall Street Journal, ―[s]tate
authorities have had mixed records so far in pursuing back taxes and penalties
in [REIT] cases.‖91 AutoZone has been pursued by two separate states
regarding its use of the REIT structure, winning the right to continue
deducting the dividends in Kentucky but losing the preliminary round in its
battle with Louisiana.92 Also, Massachusetts battled two recent acquisitions
of Bank of America—Fleet Funding and Bank Boston Corp.—over their
REIT structure, and Hawaii and Alabama have also engaged in litigation
regarding REITs used within their states. 93 However, it is unknown how
many battles states have fought over the use of REITs to lessen a company‘s
corporate tax burden ―because such tax disputes are generally not disclosed

83. Drucker, supra note 5 (quoting filings from the case).
84. Id.
85. Ranii, supra note 82.
86. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. See id.
88. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. David Ranii, Judge Denies Giant Tax Refund, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 5,
2008, at D1. In response to the ruling, Department of Revenue spokeswoman Kim Brooks stated that
it is not ―‗just a victory for the Department of Revenue, it is really a victory for every North Carolina
taxpayer.‘‖ Id.
90. Staff Reports, Wal-Mart to Appeal Tax Refund Ruling, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Feb. 5, 2008, at D2.
91. Drucker, supra note 5.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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unless lawsuits are publicly filed or the company reveals them in [Security
Exchange Commission] filings.‖94
2. Wisconsin Banks and the PIC
Since early in this decade, the Wisconsin Department of Revenue has
been engaged in an ongoing battle with state banks using another type of tax
shelter—the PIC.95 Wisconsin banks set up subsidiaries to hold their
investment assets in states that have no corporate income tax, such as Nevada
or Delaware.96 In doing so, the banks transfer investment income that would
otherwise be taxable in Wisconsin to places where it is not, thereby avoiding
paying taxes on the assets.97 This loophole exists in many non-combined
reporting states and results in many corporations getting away with paying
little or no corporate tax in the state where they conduct their business. 98
Collections from Wisconsin banks declined by more than 55% from 1996 to
2000—from $39.2 million to $17.3 million, a decline that was at least
partially attributable to the increased use of this loophole. 99
In 2003, the Department of Revenue stepped in and tried to put an end to
the loophole. 100 The state has settled with at least 180 banks—slightly more
than half of the banks doing business in Wisconsin—and has collected around
$42 million in back-tax payments.101 However, some banks are still
challenging Wisconsin‘s authority to tax their Nevada PICs.102 Opponents of
Wisconsin‘s loophole-plugging strategy for combating the banks‘ taxavoidance strategy worry that ―a state defeat in a single court case could undo
all those settlements, at least with respect to future tax years.‖103 Regardless
of whether such a concern is justified, simply plugging loopholes is not
guaranteed to put an end to the problem in the long run.
Another version of the PIC strategy is the intangible holding company or
trademark holding company loophole, where corporations transfer intangible
assets that make money outside of the company to subsidiaries in non94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Mike Ivey, State Banks Can Keep Subsidiaries, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.),
Sept. 16, 2004, at 1E.
96. See id.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Sheldon H. Laskin, Only a Name? Trademark Royalties, Nexus, and Taxing That
Which Enriches, 22 AKRON TAX J. 1, 5 (2007).
99. Mike Ivey, Even Small Banks Follow the Leaders; They Set Up Shell Subsidiaries in NoTax States, Series: Wisconsin Taxes Who Really Pays?, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), May 14,
2003, at 7A; see also MAZEROV, supra note 26, at 10.
100. Ivey, supra note 95.
101. MAZEROV, supra note 26, at 10–11.
102. Id. at 11.
103. Id.
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combined reporting states or states with no corporate income tax altogether. 104
A 2002 Wall Street Journal article highlighted the use of the loophole by
corporations across the country whereby they transfer their trademarks to the
subsidiary holding company and then pay ―huge fees for use of the brand
names.‖105 Those royalty fees are then deducted from state income to reduce
the company‘s tax liability.106
Of the almost fifty corporations identified by the article, one of special
significance to the Wisconsin Department of Revenue was Kohl‘s. 107 The
same year the article was published, the Department sought ―$800,000 in back
taxes‖ from Kohl‘s for the tax years 1994 to 1996.108 The case was settled out
of court in 2003 so it is uncertain how much Wisconsin was ultimately able to
collect; Kohl‘s tax payments in subsequent years have also been kept secret,
so it is unknown what effect the litigation had on Kohl‘s use of the holding
company loophole. 109
Although the use of many of these specific loopholes by these specific
companies has been shut down by the Department of Revenue‘s targeted
litigation over the past decade, future use of these and similar tax avoidance
strategies is likely. The only proven way to eliminate their use is to adopt
combined reporting. Opponents of combined reporting worry that a state tax
structure requiring corporations to pay more in state and local taxes each year
will counteract the already daunting task of luring corporations to
Wisconsin. 110 However, requiring corporations to pay their fair share for
valuable state-sponsored resources will actually help the business climate by
increasing the revenues that pay for those resources.
104. Id. at 9. The most notable use of the intangible holding company strategy is Toys R Us‘s
use of a holding company to hold and license the use of its trademarks and trade names. See
Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm‘n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 15 (S.C. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992
(1993). The Geoffrey court concluded that ―by licensing intangibles for use in [South Carolina] and
deriving income from their use [in South Carolina], Geoffrey [had] a ‗substantial nexus‘ with South
Carolina.‖ Id. at 18; see also Cory D. Olson, Follow the Giraffe’s Lead—Lanco, Inc. v. Director,
Division of Taxation Gets Lost in the Quagmire that Is State Taxation, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
789, 804–05 (2005).
105. Glenn R. Simpson, Diminishing Returns: A Tax Maneuver In Delaware Puts Squeeze on
States—Trademark-Holding Companies Help Limited, Many Others Save Millions of Dollars—One
Address for 670 Firms, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 2002, at A1.
106. Id.
107. Id. For a complete list of the companies discovered by the Wall Street Journal to be using
this form of tax avoidance, see MAZEROV, supra note 26, at 7.
108. Mike Ivey, State Takes Kohl’s Corp. to Court in Pivotal Tax Case, Series: Wisconsin
Taxes Who Really Pays?, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), May 14, 2003, at 7A.
109. See INST. FOR WIS.‘S FUTURE, supra note 9, at 15.
110. See, e.g., NACKER, supra note 26, 9–10; Jeff Schoepke, Wis. Mfrs. & Commerce, Insight:
A National View of Wisconsin‘s Business Tax Climate (2007), http://www.wmc.org/printdisplay.cfm
?ID=1904; Sen. Dave Schultz, Our Public Policy Must Back Up Our Goals (Apr. 27, 2007),
http://www.legis.wi.gov/senate/sen17/news/Press/2007/col2007-002.asp.
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C. Wisconsin’s Business Climate
Business climate is typically defined as a combination of factors relating
to the investment potential of a certain location. 111 These factors include:
(1) the quality and availability of the social and physical
infrastructure that are the building blocks of successful
economies; (2) measures of how strong the economy is and
how well it provides opportunities for employment, profits,
and an improving quality of life; (3) tax and fiscal measures,
which indicate the extent to which individuals and companies
are taxed and how those funds are used to grow the economy;
and (4) indicators of an area‘s reputation in the business
community for being accommodating and responsive to the
needs of business.112
Among the many arguments against higher taxes, proponents of the
contention that taxes are damaging to the business climate maintain that lower
taxes are good for economic growth because of the image they create
regarding the state‘s support of business interests. 113 However, business
decision makers are not likely to base such important decisions on a
perception of what a certain state does or does not support. They are more
likely to evaluate the entire cost-of-doing-business picture in addition to the
availability of valuable public services and a skilled workforce. 114
It is no secret that Wisconsin‘s business climate could use
improvement. 115 When the Tax Foundation released its 2009 State Business
Tax Climate Index in October 2008, Wisconsin was ranked thirty-eight, up
one spot from the 2008 rankings but still only two spots away from being in

111. Robert G. Lynch, Weaknesses in the Common Arguments for State and Local Tax Cuts
and Incentives, 32 ST. TAX NOTES 597, 601 (2004).
112. Id.
113. See Pomp, supra note 11, at 59–60. Pomp notes that opponents of combined reporting
often ―cloak themselves with the banner of economic development‖ by arguing that combined
reporting will hurt Wisconsin‘s business climate by ―chas[ing] businesses out of the state,
discourag[ing] new ones from coming to Wisconsin, and reduc[ing] jobs.‖ Id. at 60.
114. Id. at 61. Pomp lists ten reasons why legislators should not listen to arguments that link
changes in the tax system that are opposed by business to poor economic development. Id. at 61–66.
Specifically, Pomp notes that ―innumerable factors are important to a business in its decision about
where to locate,‖ including ―quality and cost of labor, proximity to markets, . . . the level and quality
of public services, and the range of other amenities that enter into the general quality of life offered.‖
Id. at 61–63.
115. See, e.g., JOSHUA BARRO, TAX FOUND., BACKGROUND P APER: 2009 STATE BUSINESS
TAX CLIMATE INDEX 3 tbl.1 (2008), available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/bp58.pdf; David
Brunori, Does the State Tax Climate Really Matter?, 39 ST. TAX NOTES 887, 887 (2006).
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the bottom ten. 116 Wisconsin also moved from thirty-two to twenty-nine on
the Corporate Tax Index between 2007 and 2009.117 Nothing to be proud of,
but a low ranking on such a list does not guarantee that businesses will not
want to locate within Wisconsin‘s borders. 118
Tax is not the only consideration businesses make when deciding where to
locate. 119 ―[S]tate spending on infrastructure and education‖ may also have a
―positive effect on business activity.‖ 120 Furthermore, there are at least a
dozen different business climate indexes that all utilize different criteria and
evaluation methods in their analysis, and Wisconsin‘s ranking on each index
varies.121 For example, Wisconsin has been ranked as high as sixteenth on the
Beacon Hill Institute‘s 2005 Metro Area and State Competitiveness Report, 122
but on Site Selection magazine‘s recent ranking of United States business
climates, Wisconsin was not listed among the states placing in the top twentyfive. 123

116. BARRO, supra note 115, at 3 tbl.1.
117. Id. at 12 tbl.3. The five major components that make up the Tax Foundation‘s State
Business Tax Climate Index, with Wisconsin‘s 2008 ranking in parentheses, are corporate tax (29th),
individual income tax (44th), sales tax (18th), unemployment insurance tax (25th), and property tax
(31st). Id. at 9 tbl.2.
118. For example, Forbes magazine recently ranked Milwaukee as one of the top ten up-andcoming cities for technology companies. William Pentland, Top 10 Up-And-Coming Tech Cities,
FORBES, Mar. 10, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/2008/03/10/columbus-milwaukee-houston-ent-techcx_wp_0310smallbizoutlooktechcity.html. In addition, Forbes recently ranked Madison, Wisconsin,
as the number one city for job growth in 2009. Tara Weiss, Ten Cities for Job Growth in 2009,
FORBES, Jan. 5, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/leadership/2009/01/05/cities-jobs-employmentleadership-careers-cx_tw_0105cities.html.
119. Brunori, supra note 115, at 887–88.
120. Id. at 888.
121. See generally GEORGE BITTLINGMAYER ET AL., KANSAS, INC. BUSINESS CLIMATE
INDEXES: WHICH WORK, WHICH DON‘T, AND WHAT CAN THEY SAY ABOUT THE KANSAS
ECONOMY ? 5, 19–21 tbl.1 (2005), available at http://www.kansasinc.org/pubs/working/Business%
20Climate%20Indexes.pdf (providing information regarding each index).
122. BEACON HILL INST., METRO AREA AND STATE COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2005, at 68,
available at http://www.beaconhill.org/Compete05/FinalCompete05-060921.pdf.
Additionally,
Milwaukee was ranked twenty-fifth out of fifty metropolitan areas. Id. at 96. The Beacon Hill study
measures competitiveness by studying eight indicators of the quality of the business environment:
government and fiscal policies; security; infrastructure; human resources; technology; business
incubation; openness; and environmental policy. Id. at 9–10.
123. Mark Arend & Adam Bruns, Force Field, SITE SELECTION, Nov. 2007, at 879. The Site
Selection ranking is developed based on surveys of corporate real estate decision makers and actual
project activity. Id. According to Site Selection’s survey of corporate real estate executives, the state
and local tax scheme of a location ranked as the third most important factor involved in location
decisions. Id. at 915. The availability of incentives and flexibility of incentives programs came in at
fifth and eighth, respectively. Id. The top two spots went to the availability of desired workforce
skills and the ease of permitting and regulatory procedures. Id. Based on this survey, it seems that,
while tax is a very important consideration, it is not the most important.
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Furthermore, it has been argued that ―state and local taxes are not
typically a significant cost of doing business.‖124 According to a 2004 State
Tax Notes article by Robert G. Lynch, state and local taxes are only a small
piece of the business costs pie, and they ―reduce profits only to a limited
extent.‖125 Increasingly, corporations are looking to quality of life factors for
choosing where to locate, including schools, safety, transportation, and other
cultural aspects that will help draw top-quality employees. 126 ―Businesses
need to know that they can rely on high-quality, well-administered public
services to facilitate the conduct of their enterprises.‖127
Instead of focusing on the potential hit Wisconsin‘s business climate
might take if corporations are required to account for all income attributable
to Wisconsin, perhaps a better focus is on what nontax-related steps
Wisconsin can take to better its business climate. According to the recent
report by the Institute for Wisconsin‘s Future, many of the public services that
businesses value when making location decisions are facing budget
shortfalls.128 The main reason for the reduction and/or elimination of many of
these vital services is the absence of adequate state aid. 129
Corporate tax revenue is an important and significant contributor to the
funding of valuable state and local programs. Ernst & Young‘s annual review
of state and local business taxes estimates that Wisconsin businesses paid
35% of all state taxes collected and 47% of all local taxes. 130 However, the
United States‘ averages are 40% and 52%, respectively.131 If Wisconsin
corporations paid at the same level as the national average, they would pay an
additional $800 million each year.132 ―As a taxpaying partner in supporting
state and local services, Wisconsin‘s corporate sector ranks [forty-first]
among all the states, according to Ernst & Young.‖ 133 Instead of corporations
paying this amount, the burden of paying for valuable public services is
passed on to individuals in the form of property and sales taxes. Adopting a
system that requires corporations to pay their fair share, like combined
124. Lynch, supra note 111, at 597.
125. Id.
126. INST. FOR WIS.‘S FUTURE, supra note 9, at 1.
127. Lynch, supra note 111, at 601.
128. INST. FOR WIS.‘S FUTURE, supra note 9, at 3. Among the public systems the report lists as
being in crisis are public schools (forced to cut staff and eliminate services offered to students),
universities and technical colleges (raising tuition and cutting financial aid), fire safety and
emergency medical services (personnel levels reduced), and programs designed to help people with
disabilities (programs reduced or eliminated). Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 8–9.
131. Id. at 9.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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reporting, would force corporations to help support the public services that
they value.
III. THREE STRATEGIES FOR ATTACKING TAX AVOIDANCE LOOPHOLES
Wisconsin needs to make changes to its current tax strategy in order to
reduce the diminishing amount of taxes collected from corporations doing
business within its borders, as well as increase the revenues needed to reinvest
in valuable public services that will increase economic growth and
development and, hopefully, lead to an improved business climate. To
achieve these goals, Wisconsin has a few options. First, it can continue its
strategy of attacking tax avoidance strategies and loopholes as they become
apparent. Second, it can adopt legislation aimed at stopping certain tax
avoidance strategies. Third, it can adopt combined reporting.
A. Attack Loopholes as They Become Apparent
An alternative to adopting combined reporting, and a strategy used by
Wisconsin, is to attack each tax avoidance strategy individually. Attacking
tax avoidance strategies and loopholes as they become apparent can be an
effective strategy, but only for stopping specific tax avoidance strategies. It
does nothing to stop the other similar shelters that would be stopped with
combined reporting. Additionally, attacking each shelter individually is a
costly and time-consuming endeavor.134
Further, a court decision or legislation blocking a certain loophole may be
vulnerable to legal challenges in the future and may undo all the work that
closed the loophole in the first place. 135 A properly drafted combined
reporting system would not be so vulnerable, as the system‘s use has twice
been upheld by the Supreme Court.136 The best example of this strategy‘s
apparent success—but more accurately described as its potential failure—is
the PIC loophole plugged in 2003 and discussed earlier.137 Similarly, even if
the Department of Revenue wins a Tax Appeals Commission case against a
company like Wal-Mart, there is no guarantee that it will be able to collect the
taxes, and nothing will stop the company‘s creative accounting and legal
professionals from inventing new, more elusive tax avoidance strategies. 138
134. Consider, for example, that each shelter attack has to go through the judicial process,
complete with all the monetary and opportunity costs of litigation.
135. See supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of Wisconsin‘s PIC litigation.
136. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 303 (1994); Container Corp.
of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 184 (1983).
137. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
138. And rightfully so. As Judge Learned Hand stated, ―Any one may so arrange his affairs
that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay
the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one‘s taxes.‖ Helvering v. Gregory, 69
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Wisconsin needs a more permanent plan that will bring in more revenue and
stop these tax avoidance strategies across the board.
Additionally, this strategy does nothing to improve the business climate.
It is the strategy that has been used in Wisconsin for many years, and—as
various rankings and studies have shown—the Wisconsin business climate is
lackluster at best.139 Improving the business climate requires investing in
public services and training a skilled workforce. 140 Spending valuable state
resources attacking tax avoidance strategies through litigation does neither of
these and is counterproductive to the goal of improving the business climate.
B. Adopt Targeted Legislation
Wisconsin policy makers have been working on ways to fix the state‘s
corporate tax structure in a way that will reduce or eliminate the lost revenues
from tax avoidance strategies employed by companies like Wal-Mart. Most
significantly, the Wisconsin Legislature adopted a related-entity addback
provision, 141 which requires certain entities to add back interest and rental
expenses paid to related entities that were deducted from taxable income at
the federal level before determining taxable income at the state level. 142 More
importantly, the addback provision effectively closes the Wal-Mart REIT
loophole.
Addback statutes similar to the one enacted in Wisconsin began to appear
widely around the new millennium. 143 Although each state‘s statute differs
slightly, the general purpose of each is the same: to cure the PIC and REIT
loopholes by requiring companies to account for related-party transactions. 144
Most addback statutes require the addback of interest or royalty expenses

F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934). As long as the loopholes exist, tax professionals should not be faulted
for using them. However, combined reporting would close these loopholes.
139. See supra Part II.C.
140. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 111, at 601.
141. WIS. STAT. § 71.26(2) (2007–2008), enacted by 2007 Wis. Act 226 § 70.
142. Memorandum from the Legislative Fiscal Bureau to the Members of the Comm. of
Conference 19–22 (May 12, 2008), available at http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lfb/200709Bills/2008_05_12_cc.pdf. The provision applies to corporations, S-Corporations, partnerships,
LLCs, individuals, fiduciaries, and insurance companies. Wis. Dep‘t of Rev., Addback of Related
Party Interest and Rent Expenses (June 19, 2008), http://www.revenue.wi.gov/taxpro/news/
080619.pdf.
143. Michigan was the first state to enact an addback statute in 1975. Christopher R. Grissom
& Janette M. Lohman, Challenges to Addback Statutes: Will the Statutes Survive?, 46 ST. TAX
NOTES 757, 760 (2007). Since then at least sixteen states, as well as the District of Columbia have
done so, including Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and
Virginia. Id.
144. Id.
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unless the transaction meets one or more exceptions. 145 Some of the common
exceptions include:146 situations where the taxpayer has entered a written
agreement with the department responsible for tax collection to use an
alternative apportionment method; 147 the adjustments are unreasonable; 148 and
various versions of an exception if the taxpayer can prove that the payment
was not made with the purpose of tax avoidance. 149
Wisconsin‘s addback provision has the same goals. As Governor Doyle
put it, the addback statute ―[c]loses an unacceptable tax loophole used by
multinational corporations to shift profits out of the state to avoid paying
Wisconsin taxes.‖150 Specifically the provision states that ―the amount
deducted or excluded under the Internal Revenue Code for interest expenses
and rental expenses that are directly or indirectly paid, accrued, or incurred to,
or in connection directly or indirectly with one or more direct or indirect
transactions with, one or more related entities.‖151 Addback is not required
under the following exceptions:
The amount is disclosed and:
1. The related party to which the taxpayer paid, accrued,
or incurred the interest or rental expenses paid, accrued, or
incurred such amounts to an unrelated party;
2. The related party was subject to tax on, or measured by,
its net income in Wisconsin or any other state, U.S.
possession, or foreign country, and the aggregate effective
145. Id.
146. See id. at 760–71 for a summation of the addback statutes in nineteen states and the
District of Columbia.
147. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 40-18-35(b)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008).
148. See, e.g., id.
149. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 40-18-35(b)(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008) (requiring that the
related-party is not primarily engaged in managing, acquiring, or maintaining intangible property or
related-party financing); ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-51-423(g)(1)(B)(i) (West Supp. 2008) (requiring that
the related-party payment was an arms-length transaction); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12218c(c)(2)(A) (West 2008) (requiring that the related-party ―during the same income year directly or
indirectly paid, accrued or incurred such portion to a person who is not a related member‖).
150. Gov. Jim Doyle, Governor’s Veto Message, WIS. ASSEMBLY J. 792, 793 (2008). The
Governor also noted that he concurred with the Legislature‘s intent that the addback provision would
not lead to corporations being taxed twice, and he requested that the Department of Revenue ensure
that such intent be carried through in interpreting and enforcing the provision. See id. at 794.
151. WIS. STAT. § 71.26(2)(a)(7) (2007–2008). ―Related entity‖ is defined by section
71.01(9am) of the Wisconsin Statutes as ―any person related to a taxpayer as provided under section
267 or 1563 of the Internal Revenue Code . . . and any real estate investment trust under section 856
of the Internal Revenue Code, except a qualified real estate investment trust.‖ Id. § 71.01(9am)
(2007–2008).
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tax rate applied to the income is at least 80% of the
taxpayer‘s aggregate effective rate; or
3. The taxpayer establishes that the transaction has a
business purpose other than the avoidance or reduction of
tax, the transaction changed the taxpayer‘s economic
position in a meaningful way apart from the tax effects,
and the interest and/or rental expenses were paid at an
arm‘s-length rate.152
However, the provision only requires the addback of interest and rental
payments—it does not require the addback of royalty payments. 153
Consequently, it does nothing to stop corporations from utilizing the
intangible holding company loophole to avoid taxes on royalty income from
intellectual property. 154
Additionally, there is some concern regarding whether the addback
statutes will stand up against constitutional challenges. Specifically, it has
been argued that corporate taxpayers may be able to defeat addback statutes
because the addback requirement is actually a tax on the out-of-state related
entity; the out-of-state related entity does not have taxable presence in the
taxing state, and, therefore, the provision violates the Commerce and Due
Process Clauses of the United States Constitution because it attempts to tax
extraterritorial values. 155
As widespread use of addback provisions is a relatively recent trend, there
have been only a few judicial challenges as of yet, and it is still unclear in
whose favor the balance will weigh. In the first of such decisions, VFJ
Ventures, Inc. v. Surtees, Inc.,156 an Alabama circuit court found that VFJ
Ventures did not have to add back royalty payments to two related-party
intangible management companies because, under an Alabama statutory

152. Id. § 71.80(23) (2007–2008); see also Sakurai, supra note 64, at 807 (summarizing
common exceptions to addback statutes).
153. Jamshed Patel, Corporate Income Tax: Intangible Holding Companies, LEXISNEXIS
PRACTICE INSIGHTS (2008), available at Lexis WI Tax P.I. 4,160.
154. Id.
155. Philip M. Plant, The Addback Statute Wars—The Taxpayers’ Case, 37 STATE TAX NOTES
585, 585–86 (2005); see also Grissom & Lohman, supra note 143 (highlighting the potential issues
that may arise under the four prongs of the Complete Auto Commerce Clause analysis as well as the
Foreign Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause). But see Sheldon H. Laskin, Contention on
State Income Tax Addback Statutes is Based on a Misconception, 27 ST. TAX NOTES 701 (2005)
(responding to Plant‘s article and asserting that payments triggering addback statutes are sufficiently
related to business income in the taxing state).
156. Montgomery County Circuit Court, No. CV-03-3172 (Ala. Jan. 24, 2007) (text of decision
available in 2007 State Tax Notes 20-6).
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exception, requiring VFJ Ventures to do so would be unreasonable. 157 In his
decision, Judge McCooey stated that the payments were a necessary cost of
doing business, and therefore, requiring VFJ Ventures to add back the
payments would frustrate the purpose of the addback statute, which is to
―prevent abusive deductions and to ensure that income fairly attributable to
Alabama is taxed in Alabama.‖158
However, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals overturned Judge
McCooey‘s decision, holding that the unreasonable exception applied only
when the addback results in ―taxation that is out of proportion to [the
corporation‘s] activities in [Alabama].‖159 The court agreed with the Alabama
Department of Revenue‘s interpretation of the unreasonableness exception as
―not being determined by business purpose or economic substance.‖ 160
Consequently, VFJ Ventures was required to add back the royalty payments
made to the related entities.161
Regardless of the results of such litigation in Wisconsin or other states, it
seems that Wisconsin‘s addback statute may not provide a sufficient response
to the problems of corporate tax avoidance. 162 In another legislative effort to
solve the problem, Senator Dave Hansen (D-Green Bay) introduced the
Corporate Tax Accountability Act in December 2007.163 The Act was
introduced in response to a report by the Milwaukee-based Institute for
Wisconsin‘s Future regarding corporate tax avoidance. 164 According to the

157. Id. at 5.
158. Id.
159. Surtees v. VFJ Ventures, Inc., No. CV-03-3172, 2008 WL 344118, at *26 (Ala. Civ. App.
Feb. 8, 2008), aff’d sub. nom; Ex parte VFJ Ventures, Inc., No. CV-03-3172, 2008 WL 4277998, at
*1 (Ala. Sept. 19, 2008).
160. VFJ Ventures, Inc., 2008 WL 344118, at *13.
161. See id. at *28.
162. It has been argued that addback statutes are the ―second best solution‖ to addressing the
problems of holding company tax avoidance. Mark J. Cowan & Clint Kakstys, A Green Mountain
Miracle and the Garden State Grab: Lessons From Vermont and New Jersey on State Corporate Tax
Reform,
60
TAX
LAW.
351,
362
(2007),
available
at
http://www.wispolitics.com/1006/071219hansen.pdf
(internal
quotation
marks
omitted).
Specifically, Cowan and Kakstys argue that there are four problems with addback statutes: (1) they
are ―fairly easy to plan around‖; (2) the exceptions ―create litigation‖; (3) they ―do not address the
shifting of income that occurs from the movement of assets to no-tax states‖; and (4) ―there may be
constitutional issues.‖ Id. at 362–63.
163. S.B. 367, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2007); Press Release, Wis. Sen. Dave Hansen,
Senator Hansen Introduces Corporate Tax Accountability Act (Dec. 20, 2007); Ivey, supra note 63.
The proposed Act, however, was still in the possession of the Senate at the end of the general
business floor period that adjourned on March 13, 2008. Chief Clerk’s Entries, WIS. SENATE J., Mar.
21, 2008, at 735. Accordingly, it failed to pass pursuant to Senate Joint Res olution 1 and was
adversely disposed of on March 21, 2008. Id.
164. INST. FOR WIS.‘S FUTURE, supra note 9, at 1.
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report, uncollected corporate taxes cost Wisconsin $643 million in 2006. 165
The Act was aimed at stopping what the report referred to as ―corporate tax
leakage‖166 by requiring corporations to disclose the following:




Their bottom-line tax liability in the state, including
any tax credits or exemptions that affect their income
for tax reasons.
Any subsidiaries and their existing relationships that
may affect taxable income in Wisconsin.
Information that would help identify other legal ways
in which corporations reduce or avoid paying their
fair share of state taxes.167

While the addback statute and the proposed Corporate Tax Accountability
Act are both a step in the right direction for Wisconsin, they may not answer
the problems of increasing revenue collection and avoiding corporate use of
tax avoidance strategies. The best method for accomplishing both goals is the
adoption of a state tax strategy that utilizes combined reporting.
C. Adopt Combined Reporting
Combined reporting, as a state tax strategy, simply requires corporations
to pay their fair share of state corporate income tax. In addition to eliminating
the REIT loophole used by Wal-Mart, it would also eliminate any tax
avoidance scheme that ―shift[s] taxable profits into a tax-haven subsidiary‖ or
―stash[es] corporate assets that earn income from outside the corporation.‖ 168
Additionally, combined reporting would be effective against other forms of
tax avoidance, such as the strategies known as transfer pricing169 and nexus
165. Id. at 6.
166. Id. at 1. The Institute for Wisconsin‘s Future defines ―corporate tax leakage‖ as ―the loss
of state corporate income tax due to large companies‘ tax avoidance using tax breaks, loopholes and
profit shelters.‖ Id.
167. Corporate Tax Accountability Act, S.B. 367, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2007); Press
Release, Wis. Sen. Dave Hansen, supra note 163.
168. MAZEROV, supra note 26, at 2–3.
169. Transfer pricing occurs when a manufacturer corporation creates a subsidiary to control its
distribution and sales activities within a state where its customers are located. Id. at 19. The price
paid for the products by the distribution subsidiary to the manufacturing plant is known as the
―transfer price.‖ Id. If both the plant and its distribution subsidiary are located in non-combined
reporting states, the corporation may ―set its transfer prices in a way that minimizes its total tax
liability.‖ Id. To combat tax-motivated transfer pricing, almost every non-combined reporting state
―allows its tax department to adjust transfer prices on a case-by-case basis to fairly reflect the income
actually earned in the state.‖ Id. at 20. However, it is not practical for state tax departments to audit
the millions of transactions that occur every year. Id. Combined reporting would eliminate the need
to do so, as well as eliminate tax-motivated transfer pricing altogether. See id. at 20, 22.
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isolation, where companies ―‗wall-off‘ as much of the corporation‘s profit as
possible in a subsidiary that is not taxable in the state(s) where the
subsidiary‘s customers are located.‖170
The myriad of benefits resulting from combined reporting can all be
encapsulated by its two main advantages. First, combined reporting renders
the tax planning techniques discussed in this Comment moot. 171 Not only
does this eliminate tax avoidance, but also it allows corporations to structure
themselves in a way that is most advantageous to their operations instead of
adopting a structure that is most advantageous to tax planning. 172 Second,
combined reporting guarantees accuracy and equality in tax collections. 173 By
allowing the state to tax the value of the enterprise as a whole, including the
value derived from synergies and ―interdependencies that exist between
related corporations,‖ combined reporting captures a more accurate level of
the corporation‘s earnings within the state.174 Additionally, combined
reporting lessens the burden on smaller intrastate entities that may not be
fiscally able to take advantage of tax-avoidance strategies by ensuring that
such companies do not ―shoulder[] a disproportionate share of the tax
burden.‖175
Two main arguments have been advanced in opposition to combined
reporting. First, it has been argued that combined reporting as a system is too
complex, and it will create expensive and needless litigation.176 However,
while combined reporting is a complex system and it may create a learning
curve for some corporations, it is already being used in twenty-two states. 177
Many of the large interstate corporations that will be most affected by
combined reporting, such as Wal-Mart, are already doing business in
combined reporting states and will already be accustomed to its general
principles and procedures. Specifically, Illinois and Minnesota have both
been using combined reporting for over twenty years.178

170. Id. at 3. Nexus isolation takes advantage of a federal law that limits the amount of income
taxable to out-of-state corporations if the companies ―limit their activities within the state to
‗solicitation of orders.‘‖ Id. Combined reporting eliminates much of the benefit of nexus isolation
by requiring any subsidiary the state has nexus over to calculate its tax based on the profits of the
subsidiary‘s entire corporate family. Id. at 4.
171. Cowan & Kakstys, supra note 162, at 366.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 367.
175. Id. at 366.
176. Id. at 368.
177. See NACKER, supra note 26, at 5 tbl.1.
178. Id.
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Additionally, litigation regarding tax-avoidance techniques is already
occurring, such as Wisconsin‘s battles with Wal-Mart and bank PICs. 179
Combined reporting will eliminate the necessity for litigation aimed at
attacking tax loopholes. Although there is likely to be some litigation while
corporations struggle with the State over what income must be included and
which entities are part of the unitary business, the expense of such litigation
may be offset by the reduction of other tax-avoidance litigation.
Consequently, this argument is a wash.
The second argument against combined reporting is its potential effect on
the business climate. 180 Opponents of combined reporting argue that
combined reporting will cause corporations ―to leave the state, discourage
other businesses from entering the state, and result in the loss of jobs.‖ 181
However, this does not appear to be the case. Many of the states that have
adopted combined reporting consistently rank higher on business climate
rankings than Wisconsin. 182 In fact, of the twenty-two states that currently
have a combined reporting regime in place, fifteen were ranked higher than
Wisconsin on the Tax Foundation‘s index. 183 Also, of the twelve states
ranked lower than Wisconsin, five do not have combined reporting.184 It
seems that the corporate tax regime each state uses does not have a
measurable impact on the state‘s business climate. Additionally, if a
corporation wants to avoid combined reporting it would have to limit its
operations to thirty states, excluding California, Texas, Illinois, and New
York—all states with a considerable business presence. 185 It seems unlikely
that a corporation will refuse to do business in a state simply because of the
tax regime at work in that state. 186
Vermont is a good example of a state with what may be considered a poor
business tax climate that recently adopted combined reporting. Vermont
perennially ranks in the low- to mid-forties on the Tax Foundation‘s State

179. See supra Part II.B.
180. Cowan & Kakstys, supra note 162, at 368; Pomp, supra note 11, at 60.
181. Cowan & Kakstys, supra note 162, at 368.
182. See BARRO, supra note 115, at 3 tbl.1.
183. Id. Those states are: Alaska (4th), Montana (6th), Texas (7th), New Hampshire (8th),
Oregon (9th), Utah (11th), Colorado (13th), Michigan (20th), Arizona (22nd), Illinois (23rd), Hawaii
(24th), Idaho (29th), North Dakota (30th), Kansas (31st), and West Virginia (36th). Id.
184. Id. Those states are North Carolina (39th), Iowa (44th), Maryland (45th), Rhode Island
(46th), and New Jersey (50th). Id.
185. See NACKER, supra note 26, at 5 tbl.1.
186. However, it must be noted that a state‘s corporate tax regime may have some effect on
where companies choose to locate manufacturing and transportation operations, among other
decisions. Consequently, Wisconsin must work on improving the other aspects of its business
climate—such as availability of a skilled workforce, standard of living, education, etc.—in order to
offset any concern that such companies may have.
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Business Tax Climate Index.187 In 2003, the year before Vermont adopted
combined reporting, the state ranked forty-third. 188 In 2009, five years after
adopting combined reporting, Vermont again is ranked forty-third. 189 While a
low ranking is nothing to strive for, the fact that the state‘s business tax
climate ranking has not moved dramatically since adopting combined
reporting shows that adopting combined reporting will have little to no effect
on how companies and tax practitioners view Wisconsin‘s corporate tax
climate.
Vermont adopted its combined reporting law in 2004, the first state to do
so in over twenty years.190 The push toward combined reporting was the
result of Governor James Douglas‘s call for a state tax regime that was ―more
fair and equitable for all.‖191 Accordingly, the Vermont legislature began
crafting a combined reporting system in early 2004. 192 As part of its efforts,
the Vermont Department of Taxes presented the Vermont House Committee
on Ways and Means with a comprehensive report on combined reporting. 193
The report estimated that Vermont lost between $8.32 billion and $12.38
billion annually due to the use of tax shelters and tax-avoidance strategies. 194
The Department also ―estimated that the additional revenue generated from
enacting mandatory combined reporting would be sufficient‖ to offset
combining the tax regime with a one percent reduction in the state corporate
income tax rate.195
In addition, the Committee heard testimony from both those in favor of
combined reporting and those against. 196 Among those in favor of combined
reporting, Professor Richard Pomp testified that adopting combined reporting
in conjunction with a reduction of the corporate tax rate was the right decision
and one that he felt would improve the business climate in Vermont. 197 In
response to the common business climate argument against combined

187. See BARRO, supra note 115, at 3 tbl.1.
188. Cowan & Kakstys, supra note 162, at 396.
189. Id.; BARRO, supra note 115, at 3 tbl.1.
190. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5832 (2008); Cowan & Kakstys, supra note 162, at 390; see also
Emily Dagostino, Is New Vermont Law a Sign of a Combined Reporting Comeback?, 2004 ST. TAX
TODAY, Sept. 24, 2004 (noting that combined reporting bills or amendments were introduced in
seven other states in 2003 and 2004, which is the most legislative attention combined reporting h as
seen in twenty years).
191. Vt. Gov. James Douglas, State-of-the-State Message, J. JOINT ASSEMBLY 6 (Jan. 6, 2004),
available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/legdoc.cfm?URL=/docs/2004/journal/ja040106.htm.
192. Cowan & Kakstys, supra note 162, at 392.
193. Id. at 392–93.
194. Id. at 393.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 399–405.
197. Id. at 400.
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reporting, Professor Pomp urged Committee members not to let such
arguments influence their decision, as ―[business climate] can mean whatever
you want it to mean.‖198 He went on to note that ―combined reporting, and
taxes in general, have very little impact on business decisions and economic
growth. Businesses do consider taxes, but they weigh other factors—such as
an educated workforce, infrastructure, labor costs—much more in deciding
where to locate.‖199
In opposition to combined reporting, the Committee heard from two
groups—Associated Industries of Vermont and the Council on State
Taxation.200 Both groups focused their arguments on the traditional
arguments against combined reporting: complexity and a weakening of the
business climate. 201 The Committee, however, was not persuaded by the
opposition arguments, as the Department, Professor Pomp, and the other
arguments in favor had sufficiently addressed the limited arguments against
combined reporting presented by the two groups. 202
Consequently, combined reporting may have a positive effect on
Wisconsin‘s business climate, not a negative effect as is often assumed when
one talks of increasing taxes paid by corporations. In reality, the actual effect
of combined reporting is not an increase in taxes; it simply requires
corporations to pay the taxes they should be paying in the first place. Any
extra revenue collected by the state can then be put toward improving the
business climate in Wisconsin through increased and enhanced public services
and a betterment of the state in general.
IV. CONCLUSION
Adopting combined reporting is a necessary step for Wisconsin‘s future.
Although the business climate in Wisconsin could use improvement, allowing
corporations to continue to shirk their share of the responsibility to pay for
valuable public services is not a solution. Attacking tax avoidance loopholes
198. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
199. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
200. Id. at 401–02.
201. Id. at 402–05.
202. Id. at 405. While Vermont is an example of a state that enacted combined reporting
despite concern over its effect on the business climate, Vermont‘s law may be differentiated because
of its concurrent reduction in the corporate tax rate. Id. at 408. Such a reduction most likely
softened the blow for those traditionally against combined reporting, such as manufacturing groups
and those with conservative tax views. As the Vermont Department of Taxes noted to the Vermont
House Committee on Ways and Means, adopting combined reporting simply to raise revenues looks
like ―a revenue grab‖ and tends to be ―a tough sell from a political standpoint.‖ Id. at 397. Indeed,
the Committee ―felt it had seized the high ground because it was using the revenue from combined
reporting to reduce the corporate tax rate,‖ which insulated the Committee from anti-business
charges. Id. at 405.
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on a case-by-case basis is also not a good strategy, as each litigation costs the
state money and does not guarantee success. Additionally, the related-entity
addback provision recently added to the Wisconsin Statutes is a step in the
right direction, but it will not stop all tax avoidance strategies currently at use
in Wisconsin.
Combined reporting would eliminate the Wal-Mart REIT loophole, as
well as the PIC, intangible holding company, and transfer pricing loopholes.
In addition, it would nullify most of the other tax avoidance strategies
currently used in Wisconsin today. Although combined reporting is not a
perfect system, it is a better system. Once in place, a combined reporting
system will guarantee that the task of ―slicing [the] shadow‖ 203 of corporate
income will be a fair and just process that requires corporations doing
business in Wisconsin to help pay for the resources they value. Therefore,
Wisconsin should adopt combined reporting and use the additional revenue to
help develop valuable public services, such as providing quality education and
training for a skilled workforce, which will help draw corporations to this
state.
STACI FLINCHBAUGH
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